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Abstract
In 2009, public health agencies across the globe worked to mitigate the impact of the swine-origin influenza A (pH1N1)
virus. These efforts included intensified surveillance, social distancing, hygiene measures, and the targeted use of antiviral
medications to prevent infection (prophylaxis). In addition, aggressive antiviral treatment was recommended for certain
patient subgroups to reduce the severity and duration of symptoms. To assist States and other localities meet these needs,
the U.S. Government distributed a quarter of the antiviral medications in the Strategic National Stockpile within weeks of
the pandemic’s start. However, there are no quantitative models guiding the geo-temporal distribution of the remainder of
the Stockpile in relation to pandemic spread or severity. We present a tactical optimization model for distributing this
stockpile for treatment of infected cases during the early stages of a pandemic like 2009 pH1N1, prior to the wide
availability of a strain-specific vaccine. Our optimization method efficiently searches large sets of intervention strategies
applied to a stochastic network model of pandemic influenza transmission within and among U.S. cities. The resulting
optimized strategies depend on the transmissability of the virus and postulated rates of antiviral uptake and wastage
(through misallocation or loss). Our results suggest that an aggressive community-based antiviral treatment strategy
involving early, widespread, pro-rata distribution of antivirals to States can contribute to slowing the transmission of mildly
transmissible strains, like pH1N1. For more highly transmissible strains, outcomes of antiviral use are more heavily impacted
by choice of distribution intervals, quantities per shipment, and timing of shipments in relation to pandemic spread. This
study supports previous modeling results suggesting that appropriate antiviral treatment may be an effective mitigation
strategy during the early stages of future influenza pandemics, increasing the need for systematic efforts to optimize
distribution strategies and provide tactical guidance for public health policy-makers.
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Introduction
In March/April 2009, a new swine-origin strain of influenza A/
H1N1 virus (pH1N1) was detected in human populations in
California and Mexico. The U.S. government declared a Public
Health Emergency on April 26, 2009, followed on June 12 by a
declaration of a global pandemic by the World Health
Organization. By May 6, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) had distributed 11 million of the 50 million
antiviral treatment courses held in the federal portion of the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS); since the recipients had local
stockpiles as well, this allowed the CDC to exceed the pre-
determined target of distribution of 31 million treatment courses of
oseltamivir and zanamivir prior to the acceleration phase of the
pandemic [1]. Accompanying the distribution was guidance
recommending the use of antivirals primarily for treatment of
suspected or confirmed cases of severe respiratory infection caused
by this new strain [2]. Recent extrapolations from reported cases
estimate that the pandemic caused over 50 million infections in the
U.S. population; the majority of these have been asymptomatic or
clinically mild, but pH1N1 nevertheless led to a substantial burden
of hospitalization and death [3,4].
In contrast to the clear guidance for public health leaders
regarding the initial shipment of antivirals, the evidence base for
determining the fate of the remainder of the stockpile is thin. Key
policy statements have called for the use of mathematical models
to support the development of an evidence-based policy for
effectively deploying the remaining antiviral stockpile and other
limited or costly measures to limit morbidity and mortality from
pH1N1 [5,6]. While mathematical modelers have taken great
strides towards building predictive models of disease transmission
dynamics within human populations, the computational complex-
ity of these models often precludes systematic optimization of the
demographic, spatial and temporal distribution of costly resources.
Thus the typical approach has been to evaluate a relatively small
set of candidate strategies [7–10].
Here, we use a new algorithm that efficiently searches large
strategy spaces to analyze the optimal use of the U.S. antiviral
stockpile against pandemic influenza prior to widespread and
effective vaccination. Specifically, we seek to compute explicit
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infections in the first twelve months of an epidemic like that
caused by pH1N1, with the objective of delaying disease
transmission to allow for the development and deployment of a
vaccine. We assume, in line with recent CDC guidance, that
antivirals will be used exclusively for treatment of symptomatic
individuals rather than wide-scale pre-exposure prophylaxis. We
apply our algorithm to a U.S. national-scale network model of
influenza transmission that is based on demographic and travel
data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics. We consider disease parameters esti-
mated for the novel 2009 pH1N1 pandemic as well as more highly
transmissible strains of pandemic influenza.
Methods
We couple a fast, scalable, and adaptable optimization
algorithm to a detailed simulation model of influenza transmission
within and among the 100 largest cities in the United States (total
population of 196 million). In brief, the method involves running a
structured set of stochastic simulations of influenza transmission,
with the optimization algorithm identifying the best choice of
intervention policy based on a specific policy goal.
Optimization method
A time-based intervention policy is a series of actions
A1,A2,...,AD taken in sequence over D time periods (Fig. 1).
Our objective is to rapidly search large sets of time-based
intervention policies to find those that will be most effective at
achieving a public health goal, such as limiting morbidity and
mortality associated with influenza. Using a stochastic disease
simulator, sim(A1,A2,...,AD), that evaluates the outcome of a
given control strategy, we would like to solve the following
optimization problem:
max
A1,A2,...,AD
E½sim(A1,A2,...,AD) ,
where E½:  denotes the expectation with respect to the stochasticity
in the simulator. For the optimization considered in this paper, the
simulator returns the fraction of individuals not infected in the first
12 months of the epidemic.
To compute solutions to the above problem, we use trees to
represent all possible policies (Fig. 1). The first (highest) level of a
policy tree is a single node attached to several edges; each of those
edges corresponds to one of the possible actions in the first time
period and leads to a level-two node. Similarly each level-two node
is attached to edges corresponding to all possible actions during
the second time period, and so on. Each intervention policy
corresponds to a unique path through the tree.
The naive approach to finding the optimal path through the
tree is to simulate multiple disease outbreaks for each intervention
policy (path) and record the expected morbidity or mortality (or
other public health outcome measure). However, such exhaustive
searches are computationally intractable for large trees. We can
more efficiently search for the optimal policy by prudently
sampling paths from the tree.
To strategically search the tree, we use an optimization
algorithm called Upper Confidence Bounds Applied to Trees
(UCT) [11,12]. It selects paths from the tree using a multi-armed
bandit algorithm inside of each tree node. The canonical
application of a bandit algorithm is maximizing the total payoff
from playing a set of slot machines for a fixed number of rounds,
where the payoff distributions of the machines are unknown and,
in each round, we may select only one machine. In this scenario,
each edge emanating from the node corresponds to a slot machine
that can be chosen by the node’s bandit algorithm; for a policy
tree, the edges correspond to possible policy actions. Before each
policy simulation, bandit algorithms within the nodes select an
edge to follow based on the results of prior trials. The combined
choices of the bandit algorithms produce a path through the tree,
corresponding to a sequence of public health actions, that is then
passed into the simulation. The bandit algorithms determine
which edge (action) to follow next by balancing two desirable
characteristics: strong past performance and few prior trials. With
this strategic path sampling, subtrees with good performance are
explored more thoroughly than those with poor performance.
Specifically, suppose we are descending through the tree and
have arrived at node n having k edges to the next level down,
(e1,e2,...,ek), representing all possible subsequent actions. Let
N(ei) be the number of times we have used the intervention
represented by edge ei in prior simulations and R(ei) be a real
number between 0 and 1, describing the average rewards observed
during past simulations where ei was chosen. In the analysis
described below, the reward for a simulation is the fraction of
individuals that remain uninfected during the outbreak. Now
define V~
Pk
i~1 N(ei) to be the total number of times we have
used descendants of n in past simulations. We then select the next
edge as given by
Figure 1. Simple Policy Tree. Suppose there are three possible actions and, in each time step, we can only choose one of them. Each
level in the tree corresponds to a time step and branches represent possible actions. The red path through the tree represents the following three-
step time-based intervention: First choose action 3, then action 1, and finally action 3 again. The policy tree for antiviral distribution has a similar
organization. The UCT algorithm iteratively selects paths through the tree that represent intervention policies to be simulated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016094.g001
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Initially, N(e) and R(e) are set to zero for each edge. The first k
times we arrive at node n, we choose the next edge uniformly
randomly from the previously unsampled edges descending from
the node, rather than choosing an edge based on Equation [1].
This gives initial estimates of R(e) for each edge and guarantees
that Equation [1] is well defined. At the end of each simulation
run, if the simulation results in a reward of r, we update N(e) and
R(e) for each edge e in the chosen policy path, as given by
R(e)/
R(e):N(e)zr
N(e)z1
N(e)/N(e)z1:
Pandemic influenza transmission model
Our model includes the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the
United States, which we identified by aggregating Census Bureau
Statistical Areas (CBSA) that share a common airport [13,14]. We
model movement among cities using both Census Bureau’s
County-To-County Worker Flow Files [15] and the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics Origin and Destination Survey for all
quarters of 2007, which contains a 10% sample of all itineraries
between U.S. cities [16]. We assume that each exposed or
asymptomatic infectious traveler has some chance of starting an
sustained epidemic in the destination city, by initiating a chain of
transmission events to susceptible individuals. We assume further
that this happens with probability 1{ 1
R0:S, where S is the fraction
of susceptible individuals in the destination city’s population, as
holds for a simple stochastic SIR model [17]. If there are N
infected travelers this week from city A to city B and the fraction of
susceptibles in city B is S, then the model draws a binomial
random variable from the distribution Binomial(N,1{ 1
R0:S) and
creates that many new infected individuals in city B. The number
of infected travelers from city A to city B is calculated based on the
travel data given as input, under the assumptions that symptom-
atic individuals do not travel and travelers are selected uniformly
randomly from the population.
Within each city, disease transmission is modeled using a
compartmental model with five compartments: susceptible,
exposed, asymptomatic infectious, symptomatic infectious, and
recovered (Fig. 2b). Progression from one compartment to another
is governed by published estimates for pandemic influenza
transmission and disease progression rates, as given in Table 1.
When infected individuals progress from asymptomatic to
symptomatic they seek treatment at a rate U (uptake) and receive
treatment if antiviral courses are available locally. While disease
transmission is a continuous process, antivirals are distributed once
per day to those requiring treatment. Antivirals are assumed to be
80% effective [18–24]; and effectively treated cases immediately
move to the recovered compartment. Untreated and ineffectively
treated cases remain infectious until they recover naturally.
Epidemics are initialized assuming that there are 100,000 cases
of pandemic flu in the United States (corresponding to the late
June CDC estimate of over one million pH1N1 cases [25])
distributed stochastically, proportional to city sizes. Thus we are
considering distribution policies that begin approximately one to
two months following the initial emergence of the strain within the
United States. Assuming that maximal flu vaccine coverage can be
achieved within 12 months of the onset of a pandemic, we
terminate the simulations after 12 months or when all cases have
recovered, whichever occurs first. Additional parameter values,
initial conditions and time periods are explored in Supporting
Information (Text S1, Video S1).
Antiviral policy actions
The model considers 11 possible antiviral stockpile actions every
month over a twelve month period: distribution of 0, 1, 5, 10, 25
or 50 million courses apportioned either proportional to
population or proportional to current prevalence. The total
amount released during the twelve month period is not allowed to
exceed the 50 million courses available in the stockpile. We
attempt to increase the realism of the model by assuming that, post
distribution, unused courses ‘‘decay’’ through intra-jurisdictional
misallocation (in the sense of inefficient matching of doses to cases)
or frank loss at a rate W. Wastage includes courses that are
prescribed but go unused, are used to treat false positives, or are
used too late in the course of disease to be effective. It is important
to note that, for the purposes of this analysis, wastage does not
refer to willful misuse. Clinically, we assume that antivirals are
80% efficacious at reducing symptoms and forward transmission
Figure 2. Disease Model. (2a) The U.S. network model for influenza transmission. Circle sizes represent numbers of inhabitants and line thickness
represents the number of travelers between cities. (2b) Within-city compartmental model. The compartments are: susceptible (S), exposed (E),
asymptomatic infectious (IA), symptomatic infectious (IS), and resistant (R). When infected individuals progress from asymptomatic to symptomatic
they seek treatment at a rate U (uptake) and receive treatment if antiviral courses are available locally. While disease transmission is a continuous
process, antivirals are distributed once per day to those requiring treatment. Antivirals are assumed to be 80% effective; and effectively treated cases
immediately move to the recovered compartment. Untreated and ineffectively treated cases remain infectious until they recover naturally. The
parameters of the compartmental model are described in Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016094.g002
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jurisdiction with remaining distributed antivirals, then they receive
appropriate treatment (i. e., access to medications within 24 hours
of onset of symptoms) with an uptake probability of U. Effectively
treated infected cases (i. e., 0:80|U) are immediately moved from
the infectious to the recovered compartment, consistent with early
evidence of rapid decline in viral titers in treated pH1N1 patients
[26,27]. Consistent with current CDC antiviral guidance, we did
not model the use of antivirals for large scale prophylaxis of
susceptible populations in the absence of infection.
Computational requirements
Each optimization is based on 48 hours of computation on the
Linux Lonestar Cluster at the Texas Advanced Computing
Center, which offers a peak performance of 10:7 GFLOPS per
optimization process. Roughly 1,000,000 simulations can be done
in this time; however, for this relatively small action space, the
optimal policy is typically identified within six hours of
computation.
Results
First, we consider SNS distribution schedules for the 2009
pH1N1 pandemic (Figure 3). We found that simple distribution
schedules such as releasing an arbitrary fixed quantity each month
from the federal stockpile to the states proportional to population
size perform optimally, due to the mild nature of the disease. In
fact, we find very little difference between two extreme scenarios:
(a) an infinite supply of antivirals available at all times in all cities,
and (b) no federal stockpile releases beyond the 31 million initially
purchased by states (Figure 3a). At low uptake, the initial 31
million courses are sufficient to meet demand; at high uptake, the
aggressive early treatment essentially stops the epidemic before
exhausting supplies; and only at intermediate levels is the the
demand sufficiently high and the epidemic sufficiently long-lived to
exhaust the available supplies (through a combination of treatment
and wastage). A simple SNS release schedule of one million
courses per month proportional to population size (in addition to
the initial 31 million courses) is sufficient to meet the ongoing
demand, regardless of uptake, and thus performs well as an infinite
supply (Figure 3a).
The rapid allocation of the first Federal stockpile allotment and
the contributions of antivirals by the states to provide for the 31
million courses in the early stages of the epidemic are critical in
these simulations. If we remove these courses and assume
conservatively that the first Federal distributions take place
approximately 3–4 months into the pandemic, we find that
antiviral treatment only modestly slow transmission (Figure 3b).
Simple release schedules are predicted to perform much more
poorly without the initial distribution, with large early distributions
outperforming regular small distributions.
We assumed a reproduction number of R0~1:4 for 2009
pH1N1 [28–31]. In contrast, we obtained different results for
more transmissible strains of pandemic influenza, with reproduc-
tion numbers R0~1:6, R0~2:0, and R0~2:4 [10,32,33].
Figures 4a–4c include the following performance curves:
1. Several policies in which the stockpile is released monthly
in fixed quantities proportional to population size, until the
12 month time horizon is reached or until the SNS is
depleted. The releases range from 1 million courses for 12
months, to a single release of 50 million courses.
2. An idealized scenario with an infinite supply of antivirals
available to each city throughout the epidemic. The
outcome of this scenario indicates the maximal potential
impact of antiviral use at any given utilization rate, free of
any logistical constraints on supply.
3. Two optimized strategies resulting from our analysis. In one
optimized strategy, we allowed releases to be either
proportional to population size or proportional to influenza
prevalence in the city. In the other optimized strategy, we
allowed only releases proportional to population.
Table 1. Influenza transmission and intervention parameters.
Parameter Symbol Value Reference
2009 pH1N1 Parameters
reproductive number R0 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 [28–31]
mean exposed period L 1 day [29]
mean asymptomatic infectious period IA 1.05 [29,30]
mean total infectious period (asymptomatic + symptomatic) I 2.3 days [29]
Pandemic Influenza Parameters
reproductive number R0 1.6, 2.0, 2.4 [10,32,33]
mean exposed period L 1.9 days [10,32,33]
mean asymptomatic infectious period IA 1.05 [10,32,33]
mean total infectious period (asymptomatic + symptomatic) I 4.1 days [10,32,33]
Intervention parameters
antiviral efficacy e 80% [18–24]
local stockpile half-life (wastage) W 2 months
antiviral uptake U (0,1)
mean infectious period prior to effective AV treatment IAz:5 days
The parameters for 2009 pH1N1 were calculated based on an incubation period of 2:05 days, a serial interval of 2:6 days, and an assumed exposed period of 1 day [29].
The calculations lead to an infectious period coinciding with infectivity that is within 80% of peak levels [29]. The parameters for pandemic influenza are in agreement
with the literature [10,32,33]. Note that, as depicted in Figure 2b, some infectious individuals may recover before becoming symptomatic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016094.t001
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pandemic influenza require greater care in selection of antiviral
release strategy. For example, the simple policy of 1 million
courses released monthly now significantly under performs the
other strategies (Figure 4). Optimized release policies (computed
by UCT optimization) consistently perform almost as well as the
infinite supply scenario. In all cases, except when the reproduction
number is 2.4 and the uptake is 0.75, the optimality gap – difference
in performance of computed policy and best idealized outcome
divided by the best idealized outcome – is at most one tenth of one
percent. For the single outlier scenario, the optimality gap is 2:5%
for a policy using population only releases and 11:35% for a policy
Figure 3. Antiviral SNS Policy Performance for 2009 pH1N1. Since the results all values of R0 (1:3,1:4,1:5) are similar, we only present those
where R0~1:4. We compare the performance of various policies at different levels of antiviral uptake (horizontal axes) in terms of the cumulative
number of cases in the first twelve months (vertical axes). (3a) Performance of antiviral control policies assuming a pre-distribution of 31 million
courses proportional to population size. The infinite supply curve (green) corresponds to an idealized scenario where an infinite supply of antivirals is
always available to each city. The no additional release curve (blue) assumes that no courses are released beyond the pre-distributed 31 million
courses. The 1 M monthly curve (red) assumes that 1 million courses are distributed proportional to population size beginning in the third month of
the pandemic, in addition to the 31 million pre-released courses. The infinite supply curve overlaps completely with the 1 M monthly curve.
(3b) Performance of simple fixed releases proportional to population size assuming that no courses are pre-distributed and the first releases occur
approximately three months into the US epidemic (two months after our simulations are initialized with 100,000 cases). In reality, antiviral uptake
rates are limited by clinical manifestations of the disease (symptoms). For example, the presence of fever was one recommended criterion for
prescribing antivirals for pH1N1. The blue highlighted regions of the curves indicate the range of uptake rates that might be medically feasible under
proactive intervention, although the maximum attainable coverage for flu is possibly much lower than 50%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016094.g003
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performance of the mixed strategy stems from the vast size and
structure of the policy tree over which optimization is performed,
and is discussed further below.
Under realistic assumptions about transmissability, we found
that simple release schedules perform almost as well as the
optimized policies. For example, at R0~1:6, the policies of
releasing 5 million or 10 million courses monthly performed as
well as the infinite supply scenario; at R0~2:0, only the policy of
10 million courses released monthly performed as well as the
infinite supply scenario. However, at the extreme range of
influenza transmissability (i.e., R0~2:4), none of the simple
policies performed as well as the optimized policies.
In all of the simulations, the proportion of infected individuals
who seek timely treatment (what we refer to as uptake) has a
dramatic impact on both policy optimality and outcomes.
Figure 5 shows the optimized policies for pandemic flu with a
reproduction number of 2:0, allowing distributions either
proportional to population size or proportional to local disease
prevalence (Figure 5a) or only proportional to population size
(Figure 5b). At an uptake of 20%, the optimized mixed strategy
entails a single distribution of 50 M courses proportional to local
prevalence, while the optimized population-based strategy distrib-
utes 10 million courses in the first month, followed by 25 million, 1
million, 10 million, 1 million, and 1 million in the following
months. However, Figure 4b shows that these two optimized
strategies as well as fixed releases of 5 million to 50 million per
month proportional to population size perform optimally, on par
with the infinite supply scenario. Figure 5c furthermore illustrates
that, at uptake of 20%, an initial release of 25 or 50 million courses
proportional to population size performs as well as the
(population-only) optimized policy of 10 million courses. Although
there are often multiple optimal policies, this is not the case for
uptake rates ranging between 40% and 80%. At these relatively
high levels of treatment, the optimized policy is more clearly
defined (Figure 5c) and most simple policies perform suboptimally
(Figure 4b).
Even when prevalence-based releases are allowed, the optimal
policies tend to be dominated by population-based releases
(Figure 5a). This combined with the comparable performance of
exclusively population-based policies across all scenarios suggests
that prevalence-based distributions are probably unnecessary.
Thus we focus on Figures 5b and 5c to gain quantitative insights
into the relationship between uptake and best policy. At low levels
of uptake (between 0% and 15%) essentially all releases perform
optimally (Fig. 5c). At these levels of uptake, so few people are
treated that the initial 31 M courses satisfies the demand. For
uptakes between 20% and 55%, additional courses from the
Federal SNS are necessary to meet demand, and thus the optimal
policies involve sizable early releases. For uptakes between 60%
and 85%, wastage becomes even more of an issue and thus the
success of the policy is highly sensitive to the exact distribution of
the initial releases. Here, the optimal schedules delay and extend
the distribution over several months (Fig. 5b). Finally, for the
highest levels of uptake (greater than 90%), the pre-released 31 M
courses are sufficient to control the epidemic, as seen also in
Figure 4b.
Discussion
Since avian influenza H5N1 became a potential public health
threat in 2003, public health agencies around the globe have been
planning for the next influenza pandemic. While the concerted
response to pH1N1 reflects this careful preparation, several
Figure 4. Antiviral SNS Policy Performance for Pandemic
Influenza. We compare the performance of various policies at different
levels of antiviral uptake (horizontal axes) in terms of the cumulative number
of cases in the first twelve months (vertical axes) for pandemic strains with
reproduction numbers: (4a) R0~1:6,( 4 b )R0~2:0,a n d( 4 c )R0~2:4.E a c h
figure displays compares several policies including: 1) several fixed monthly
distributions proportional to population size, 2) an idealized scenario with
infinite supply of antivirals available to each city, and 3) optimized policies
allowing either a combination of population and prevelance-based releases
or solely population based releases. For strains with R0 of 1:6 and 2:0,s o m e
simple policies are predicted to perform as well as the idealized scenario,
however, for R0 of 2:4, no simple policies are comparable with the idealized
scenario. The optimized control policies always outperform the simple
policies and typically match the performance of the idealized scenario.
Similar to the results shown in Figure 3, the true maximal attainable uptake
rates would be limited by the clinical symptoms of a future pandemic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016094.g004
Antiviral Distribution for Pandemic Influenza
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e16094expected and unexpected events, including its apparent North
American origin, the rapid overburdening of U.S. laboratory
capacity, non-uniform testing and treatment policies among U.S.
states, and delays in production of a viable vaccine, all reinforce
the need for a dynamic and quantitative playbook for pandemic
mitigation using pharmaceutical countermeasures.
By adapting an established algorithm to optimize disease
mitigation policies, this study provides an advance from the
traditional candidate strategy approach to rapid and systematic
analysis of numerous policy options. This is just one of many
possible optimization methods suitable for this purpose [34–37].
Our choice of UCT was based on the insight that, with some
careful modeling, disease intervention strategies can be nicely
mapped onto policy trees and that this approach can be coupled to
any stochastic epidemic model. This approach has performed
successfully on large policy trees [38] and has favorable
convergence properties [35]. In particular, unlike simulated
annealing and genetic algorithms, it is guaranteed to eventually
converge on the optimal policy.
The UCT algorithm preferentially samples subtrees of the
policy tree that have performed well in the past (see [35] for a
mathematical discussion). The algorithm performs best when all of
the policies within a single subtree of the policy tree perform
similarly; it can then effectively determining the ‘‘goodness’’ of any
subtree by sampling it only a few times. To achieve algorithmic
efficiency, one should therefore use expert knowledge and intuition
to structure the policy tree in this way. If there is a single optimal
solution in a subtree surrounded by many poorly performing
Figure 5. Optimized Policies for Pandemic Influenza with a Reproduction Number of 2:0. (5a) Optimized policies combining prevalence-
based (red) and population-based distributions (blue). Each row gives the optimized sequence of actions for a given value of uptake. (5b) Optimized
policies allowing only population-based distributions. (5c) Performance of possible actions for the first distribution for a population-based policy, two
months after the pandemic has reached 100,000 cases. Shading indicates number of times an action was visited during the optimization routine, and
is thus proportional to the performance of the action.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016094.g005
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to find it (although it is guaranteed to eventually do so).
Unbalanced policy trees, with one subtree much deeper than
another, are natural topologies to produce such an unfavorable
grouping of solutions. The single outlier in Figure 4c was likely
caused by a combination of imbalance in the antiviral policy tree
and the sheer volume of policy options at each time point. First,
one subtree includes releasing the entire SNS in the first month
with no actions following, while another involves waiting several
months to release a small sequence of antivirals. Second, allowing
both population-based and prevalence-based distributions increas-
es the options available at each time point and reduces the depth
to which policies can be optimized in a given amount of time.
Although we know that the outlier is not the true optimal solution,
we have have opted to present it in the graphs to highlight
intuition on the algorithm’s performance. For UCT, additional
simulations are guaranteed to improve the optimality gap; in this
case, they would have moved the optimized mixed policy to at
least match the optimized population-based policy.
We initially conducted this analysis during summer 2009, as the
pH1N1 pandemic was unfolding, in response to questions posed to
us by public health agencies regarding the effective use of antivirals
prior to the availability of pH1N1 vaccines. Although the CDC
has since issued antiviral guidelines and pH1N1 vaccines are now
widely available, our analyses provide insight into the likely
impacts of antivirals on pH1N1 transmission to date and effective
strategies for antiviral-based mitigation of future flu pandemics.
Our analysis suggests that while pH1N1 may have been slowed
with targeted, aggressive, and clinically successful use of antivirals,
the impact of such a policy would have been highly insensitive to
the choice of Federal distribution schedule. The 31 million courses
already available to states prior to the pandemic would have gone
a long way towards meeting the early demand. However, for more
contagious pandemic strains (with higher reproduction numbers),
use of an optimized distribution schedule would be expected to
significantly improve the intervention outcome. In some cases,
simple strategies involving regular fixed releases perform as well as
more complex optimized strategies. For example, for a pandemic
strain with R0~2:0, a monthly distribution of 10 million regimens
divided proportional to population among the states consistently
matches or outperforms other policy options, regardless of the
levels of uptake or potential misallocation or loss of medication,
which are likely in a complex health emergency response setting.
Slight variations on this policy, for example, regular distributions
of 5 or 25 million courses are predicted to perform significantly
worse across a large range of uptake values. From a public health
perspective, the best policies are those that have robust
performance in a variety of scenarios. The search for such robust
policies can be implemented directly into the optimization
method, by having the simulator sample from a prior distribution
of scenarios. However, no guarantee exists that a single policy can
be robust against all the scenarios under consideration.
Our optimization allowed for the possibility of distributions
proportional to prevalence, although such actions are not
consistent with the current CDC policy and would likely be both
politically and logistically difficult. Technically, implementing such
a scheme would impose a major surveillance burden, as it would
necessitate the estimation of prevalence rates throughout the
nation based on noisy or delayed data. Notably, the results suggest
that prevalence-based distributions are not expected to enhance
the impact of antiviral treatments.
The impact of antiviral treatment policies is naturally sensitive
to the rate at which individuals who should receive these
countermeasures actually do in clinical settings (U). From a study
of pH1N1 antiviral uptake in Milwaukee during summer 2009,
preliminary estimates of the fraction of reported cases receiving
treatment within 48 hours of developing symptoms are less than
20% [39]. In September 2009, the CDC issued antiviral guidelines
the encouraged prioritization of high risk cases and discouraged
antiviral treatment of typical cases. This suggests that throughout
the summer and fall of 2009, we have likely been in the range
where all strategies perform equally poorly and are predicted to
minimally mitigate transmission. This is not to say that antivirals
have had no impact on pH1N1 outcomes: to date, they have been
used to significantly reduce morbidity and mortality associated
with pH1N1 when used in potentially severe cases. Thus, for
future pandemics, public health measures to increase the rates of
antiviral usage beyond current levels may have the potential to
slow transmission prior to the availability of vaccines. An increase
in uptake rates may be practically limited by clinical symptoms of
the disease in question, such as the presence of fever, which was
one recommended criterion for prescribing antivirals. Our analysis
shows, however, that the impact of antiviral control measures
depends not only on the rates of uptake but also may critically
depend on the Strategic National Stockpile distribution schedule
used to sustain that uptake, particularly for highly contagious
strains.
We did not consider the development of antiviral resistance in
this study. Currently circulating strains of seasonal influenza have
acquired resistance to oseltamivir [40] and there is evidence that
the pH1N1 virus is capable of experiencing genetic mutations that
confer resistance to at least one neuraminidase drug; thankfully, to
date there is little evidence of sustained transmission of such
mutations. We also did not incorporate the use of antivirals for
prophylaxis, the future availability of vaccines, simultaneous use of
vaccines or NPI’s like school or event closures, or the option of
targeting the stockpile towards particular demographic groups, all
of which are likely important and may influence the optimal
policy.
The effectiveness of any antiviral policy will depend critically on
the extent to which antivirals reduce the severity and transmission
of flu. Our assumptions regarding antiviral efficacy are in
agreement with the literature [18–24]; most of these studies
assume maximum likelihood-based estimates of antiviral efficacies
calculated by Longini et. al [32] using data from a clinical study by
Welliver et. al [41]. More recent clinical trials indicate that the
odds of a secondary infection in individual contacts decreases by
approximately 50% when antivirals are used on the day of onset
(OR: 0:5, 95% CI: 0:17, 1:46) [42,43]. While the antiviral efficacy
we assumed here lies well within the confidence intervals estimated
in these papers, better estimates of these and other parameter
values will certainly improve the future optimization studies.
In this study, we assume that all distributed antiviral courses
undergo wastage. There are multiple potential causes of wastage,
including courses that are prescribed to patients who never use
them, use them to treat diseases other than flu, or use them too late
in their flu infection to significantly impact transmission. Since
there is very little information on the rates at which such loss or
misuse occurs, let alone how these rates change over the course of
a pandemic, we have modeled wastage using a generic decay
function. Comparisons between the optimized policies (assuming
wastage) and an infinite supply scenario (with no wastage) suggest
that there exist distributions schedules that effectively avert
potential public health costs associated with wastage. Although
better estimates of the magnitude and dynamics of wastage would
improve the accuracy of the model and may suggest slightly
different optimal strategies, we expect that those strategies will still
overcome the potential detrimental effects of wastage.
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Bajardi et al. recently developed a similar large-scale geographic
disease spread model, with which they showed that a vaccination
campaign following the initial outbreak may require additional
mitigation strategies to delay the epidemic [44]. Danon et al.
showed, however, that such models can be sensitive to the addition
of movement patterns not captured in census data; specifically, the
addition of random movement can hasten an epidemic [45]. A
modeling study by Handel et al. suggests that when antivirals are
the only mode of control, using antivirals towards the end of the
epidemic to minimize overshoot is a good control policy [46]. An
intuitive mathematical model developed by Lipstich et al. shows
that while antiviral use likely promotes the rise of antiviral resistant
strains, they nonetheless can significantly delay the epidemic [47].
Studies by Nun ˜o et al. and Wu et al. also suggest that antivirals
used for treatment can slow the spread of the epidemic [48,49].
Vaccination studies may provide some insight into the potential
impacts of large scale antiviral prophylaxis, which we have not
considered in our analysis. For example, using a deterministic
meta-population model, Wu et al. showed that it may be
preferable to allocate large quantities of vaccines to particular
geographic areas in order to achieve local herd immunity as
opposed to distributing vaccines proportional to population [50].
Ball et al. have studied a related vaccine distribution problem on a
graph-based model of disease spread, and also show that targeting
local groups performs well if the entire sub-population can be
effectively protected [51]. Finally, Bootsma and Ferguson studied
the 1918 influenza pandemic, and found that the timing of
interventions can be critical, with delays in implementation and
premature lifting of interventions reducing the impact of control
measures [52].
From rapid genetic sequence analysis to automated syndromic
surveillance systems, public health emergency response is rapidly
improving in technical capabilities both in the U.S. and
worldwide; the rapid response to and characterization of the
novel pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) virus is a testament to this.
However, planning the policies of public health response to such
identified and emergent threats remains a highly non-quantitative
endeavor. We present here a policy optimization approach that is
highly modular and can be easily adapted to address multiple
additional issues. Our hope is that these quantitative methods will
assist clinical experts in developing effective policies to mitigate
influenza pan- and epidemics using a combined arsenal of
vaccines, antivirals and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Specif-
ically, a very similar analysis can be used at the international level
to optimize global allocation of the WHO’s limited antiviral
stockpile to resource-poor countries. One can substitute any
stochastic model of disease transmission, at any scale, for our
national-scale, U.S. influenza model. In addition, while the
optimization algorithm is particularly well suited for time-based
interventions, any well-behaved policy space can be used [35].
The approach should thereby facilitate a more comprehensive
consideration of pandemic policy options, and will perhaps
confirm the efficacy of the current policy or suggest more
promising strategic options for the future.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Supplemental information, including detailed model
description, model validation runs, and additional optimization
scenarios.
(PDF)
Video S1 Supplemental visualizations for scenarios described in
Text S1.
(MP4)
Acknowledgments
The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. The authors thank John Tegeris at BARDA for
providing up-to-date information about the U.S. Federal and state
Strategic National Stockpiles of antivirals, the BARDA influenza vaccine
group for providing up-to-date estimates for the availability of pH1N1
vaccines, the City of Milwaukee Health Department and the Harvard
Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics for sharing unpublished data
on the receipt of oseltamivir in Milwaukee. The authors acknowledge the
Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) at The University of Texas at
Austin (http://www.tacc.utexas.edu) for providing HPC resources that
have contributed to the research results reported within this paper.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: NBD SG LAM. Performed the
experiments: NBD SG LAM. Analyzed the data: NBD SG NH BP LAM.
Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: NBD SG NH BP LAM.
Wrote the paper: NBD SG NH BP LAM.
References
1. US Centers for Disease Control (2009) CDC health update: Swine influenza A
(H1N1) update: New interim recommendations and guidance for health
directors about strategic national stockpile material. http://www.cdc.gov/
h1n1u/HAN/042609.htm. CDC website, Accessed on 2010-12-14.
2. US Centers for Disease Control (2009) Questions & answers: Antiviral drugs,
2009–2010 flu season. http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/antiviral.htm. CDC web-
site, Accessed on 2010-12-14.
3. US Centers for Disease Control (2009) CDC estimates of 2009 H1N1 influenza
cases, hospitalizations and deaths in the United States, April 2009-January 16,
2010. http://cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates/April January 16.htm. CDC website,
Accessed on 2010-12-14.
4. Reed C, Angulo FJ, Swerdlow DL, Lipsitch M, Meltzer MI, et al. (2009)
Estimates of the prevalence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, united states, April–July
2009. Emerging Infectious Diseases 15: 2004–2007.
5. White House National Security Staff (2009) National framework for 2009-H1N1
influenza preparedness and response. .
6. Department of Homeland Security (2007) Homeland security presidential
directive 21. http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc 1219263961449.shtm. DHS
website, Accessed on 2010-12-14.
7. Longini I, Halloran M, Nizam A, Yang Y (2004) Containing pandemic influenza
with antiviral agents. American Journal of Epidemiology 159: 623–633.
8. Ferguson N, Cummings D, Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Riley S, et al. (2005)
Strategies for containing an emerging influenza pandemic in Southeast Asia.
Nature 437: 204–214.
9. Bansal S, Pourbohloul B, Meyers L (2006) A comparative analysis of influenza
vaccination programs. PLoS Medicine 3: e387.
10. Germann TC, Kadau K, Longini IM, Macken CA (2006) Mitigation strategies
for pandemic influenza in the United States. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. pp 5935–5940.
11. Kocsis L, Szepesva ´ri C (2006) Bandit based monte-carlo planning. Machine
Learning: ECML 2006: 282–293.
12. Auer P, Cesa-Bianchi N, Fischer P (2002) Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed
bandit problem. Machine Learning 47: 235–256.
13. Bureau of TransportationStatistics (2008) Airport master coordinate data. http://
www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table ID=288. BTS website, Accessed on
2010-12-14.
14. Census Bureau (2000) About metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas.
http://www.census.gov/population/www/metroareas/aboutmetro.html. U.S.
Census Bureau website, Accessed on 2010-12-14.
15. Census Bureau (2000) County-to-county worker flow files. http://www.census.
gov/population/www/cen2000/commuting/index.html. U.S. Census Bureau
website, Accessed on 2010-12-14.
Antiviral Distribution for Pandemic Influenza
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e1609416. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2007) Origin and destination survey, all
quarters of 2007. http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table ID=289. BTS
website, Accessed on 2010-12-14.
17. Keeling MJ, Rohani P (2008) Modeling Infectious Diseases. Princeton University
Press.
18. Lee V, Chen M (2007) Effectiveness of neuraminidase inhibitors for preventing
staff absenteeism during pandemic influenza. Emerging Infectious Diseases 13:
449–457.
19. McCaw J, McVernon J (2007) Prophylaxis or treatment? Optimal use of an
antiviral stockpile during an influenza pandemic. Mathematical Biosciences 209:
336–360.
20. Lee V, Phua K, Chen M, Chow A, Stefan M, et al. (2006) Economics of
neuraminidase inhibitor stockpiling for pandemic influenza, Singapore.
Emerging Infectious Diseases 12: 95–102.
21. Doyle A, Bonmarin I, Levy-Bruhl D, Strat Y, Desenclos JC (2006) Influenza
pandemic preparedness in France: modelling the impact of interventions.
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 60: 399–404.
22. Barnes B, Glass K, Becker N (2007) The role of health care workers and antiviral
drugs in the control of pandemic influenza. Mathematical Biosciences 209:
403–416.
23. Hota S, McGeer A (2007) Antivirals and the control of influenza outbreaks.
Clinical Infectious Diseases 45: 1362–1368.
24. Lipsitch M, Cohen T, Murray M, Levin B (2007) Antiviral resistance and the
control of pandemic influenza. PLoS Medicine 4: e15.
25. Schuchat A (2009) CDC telebriefing on investigation of human cases of novel
influenza A (H1N1). http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090626.
htm. CDC website, Accessed on 2010-12-14.
26. Ling LM, Chow AL, Lye DC, Tan AS, Krishnan P, et al. (2010) Effects of Early
Oseltamivir Therapy on Viral Shedding in 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1)
Virus Infection. Clinical Infectious Diseases 50: 963–969.
27. Yu H, Liao Q, Yuan Y, Zhou L, Xiang N, et al. (2010) Effectiveness of
oseltamivir on disease progression and viral RNA shedding in patients with mild
pandemic 2009 influenza A H1N1: opportunistic retrospective study of medical
charts in China. British Medical Journal 341: c4779.
28. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S, Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove MD, et al.
(2009) Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): Early findings.
Science 324: 1557–1561.
29. Ghani AC, Baguelin M, Griffin J, Flasche S, Pebody R, van Hoek AJ, et al.
(2009) The early transmission dynamics of H1N1pdm influenza in the United
Kingdom. PLoS Currents: Influenza: RRN1130.
30. Pourbohloul B, Ahued A, Davoudi B, Meza R, Meyers L, et al. (2009) Initial
human transmission dynamics of a novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus
(S-OIV) in North America. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 3:
215–222.
31. Yang Y, Sugimoto JD, Halloran ME, Basta NE, Chao DL, et al. (2009) The
transmissibility and control of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus. Science 326:
729–733.
32. Longini IM, Halloran ME, Nizam A, Yang Y (2004) Containing pandemic
influenza with antiviral agents. American Journal of Epidemiology 159:
623–633.
33. Mills CE, Robins JM, Lipsitch M (2004) Transmissibility of 1918 pandemic
influenza. Nature 432: 904–906.
34. Azadivar F (1999) Simulation optimization methodologies. Proceedings of the
31st conference on Winter simulation. pp 93–100.
35. Coquelin P, Munos R (2007) Bandit algorithms for tree search. Computing
Research Repository:abs/cs/0703062.
36. Mannor S, Tsitsiklis J (2004) The sample complexity of exploration in the multi-
armed bandit problem. Journal of Machine Learning Research 5: 623–648.
37. Dar E, Mannor S, Mansour Y (2002) PAC bounds for multi-armed bandit and
Markov decision processes. Proceedings of the 15th Annual Conference on
Computational Learning Theory. pp 255–270.
38. Gelly S, Wang Y (2006) Exploration exploitation in Go: UCT for Monte-Carlo
Go. In: 20th annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems.
39. Goldstein E, Cowling B, O’Hagan J, Danon L, Fang V, et al. (2010) Oseltamivir
for treatment and prevention of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus infection in
households, Milwaukee, 2009. BMC Infectious Diseases 10: 211.
40. Hurt A, Ernest J, Deng Y, Iannello P, Besselaar T, et al. (2009) Emergence and
spread of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) influenza viruses in oceania, south east
asia and south africa. Antiviral Research 83: 90–93.
41. Welliver R, Monto AS, Carewicz O, Schatteman E, Hassman M, et al. (2001)
Effectiveness of Oseltamivir in Preventing Influenza in Household Contacts: A
Randomized Controlled Trial. The Journal of the American Medical
Association 285: 748–754.
42. Goldstein E, Cowling B, O’Hagan J, Danon L, Fang V, et al. (2010) Oseltamivir
for treatment and prevention of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus infection in
households, Milwaukee, 2009. BMC Infectious Diseases 10: 211.
43. Ng S, Cowling B, Fang V, Chan K, Ip D, et al. (2010) Effects of oseltamivir
treatment on duration of clinical illness and viral shedding and household
transmission of influenza virus. Clinical Infectious Diseases 50: 707–714.
44. Bajardi P, Poletto C, Balcan D, Hu H, Goncalves B, et al. (2009) Modeling
vaccination campaigns and the fall/winter 2009 activity of the new A(H1N1)
influenza in the Northern hemisphere. Emerging Health Threats Journal 2: e11.
45. Danon L, House T, Keeling MJ (2009) The role of routine versus random
movements on the spread of disease in Great Britain. Epidemics 1: 250–258.
46. Handel A, Longini IM, Antia R (2007) What is the best control strategy for
multiple infectious disease outbreaks? Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences 274: 833–837.
47. Lipsitch M, Cohen T, Murray M, Levin BR (2007) Antiviral resistance and the
control of pandemic influenza. PLoS Medicine 4: e15.
48. Nun ˜o M, Chowell G, Gumel AB (2007) Assessing the role of basic control
measures, antivirals and vaccine in curtailing pandemic influenza: scenarios for
the US, UK and the Netherlands. Journal of The Royal Society Interface 4:
505–521.
49. Wu JT, Leung GM, Lipsitch M, Cooper BS, Riley S (2009) Hedging against
antiviral resistance during the next influenza pandemic using small stockpiles of
an alternative chemotherapy. PLoS Medicine 6: e1000085.
50. Wu JT, Riley S, Leung GM (2007) Spatial considerations for the allocation of
pre-pandemic influenza vaccination in the United States. Proceedings of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 274: 2811–2817.
51. Ball F, Mollison D, Scalia-Tomba G (1997) Epidemics with two levels of mixing.
The Annals of Applied Probability 7: 46{89.
52. Bootsma MCJ, Ferguson NM (2007) The effect of public health measures on the
1918 influenza pandemic in U.S. cities. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 104: 7588–7593.
Antiviral Distribution for Pandemic Influenza
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e16094